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There are numerous ways people can improve their cognitive capacities: good nutrition and
regular exercise can produce long-term improvements across many cognitive domains,
whilst commonplace stimulants such as coffee temporarily boost levels of alertness and
concentration. Effects like these have been well-documented in the medical literature
and they raise few (if any) ethical issues. More recently, however, clinical research has
shown that the off-label use of some pharmaceuticals can, under certain conditions, have
modest cognition-improving effects. Substances such as methylphenidate and modafinil
can improve capacities such as working memory and concentration in some healthy
individuals. Unlike their more mundane predecessors, these methods of “cognitive
enhancement” are thought to raise a multitude of ethical issues. This paper presents
the six principal ethical issues raised in relation to pharmacological cognitive enhancers
(PCEs)—issues such as whether: (1) the medical safety-profile of PCEs justifies restricting
or permitting their elective or required use; (2) the enhanced mind can be an “authentic”
mind; (3) individuals might be coerced into using PCEs; (4), there is a meaningful
distinction to be made between the treatment vs. enhancement effect of the same PCE;
(5) unequal access to PCEs would have implications for distributive justice; and (6) PCE
use constitutes cheating in competitive contexts. In reviewing the six principal issues,
the paper discusses how neuroscientific research might help advance the ethical debate.
In particular, the paper presents new arguments about the contribution neuroscience
could make to debates about justice, fairness, and cheating, ultimately concluding that
neuroscientific research into “personalized enhancement” will be essential if policy is to
be truly informed and ethical. We propose an “ethical agenda” for neuroscientific research
into PCEs.
Keywords: cognitive enhancement, brain function augmentation, ethics, modafinil, ritalin, justice, cheating,
personalized enhancement
INTRODUCTION
Recent research in neuroscience and pharmacology has demon-
strated that various pharmaceuticals can have modest cognition-
enhancing effects in healthy individuals (for reviews, see Repantis
et al., 2010; Husain and Mehta, 2011). For example, some studies
have shown that modafinil—originally developed for the treat-
ment of narcolepsy—can improve various dimensions of cogni-
tive function in sleep-deprived (Wesensten et al., 2005; Thomas
and Kwong, 2006) and non-sleep-deprived healthy adults (Turner
et al., 2003; Müller et al., 2004). Similarly, methylphenidate—
originally developed for the treatment of Attention Deficit
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD)—has been shown to improve
spatial working memory and planning in healthy adults (Elliott
et al., 1997; Mehta et al., 2000).
Unlike the more mundane methods for improving cognitive
function—such as exercise and good nutrition (Dresler et al.,
2012)—these pharmaceutical cognitive enhancers (PCEs) are
thought to raise a host of ethical issues for individuals and soci-
ety (Greely et al., 2008; Bostrom and Sandberg, 2009). At the
individual level, concerns are raised about medical safety and side
effects, the authenticity of the enhanced mind and the value of
achievements facilitated by pharmaceutical intervention. At the
societal level, ethical questions can be asked about whether the
availability of PCEs would increase or undermine equality, and
about whether individuals will be directly or indirectly coerced
into using PCEs. Further normative questions emerge particu-
larly in the healthcare setting: should we be drawing a sharp line
between treatment and enhancement and should individuals be
given access to PCEs through medical professionals?
In this paper, we outline the key issues at stake in the norma-
tive debate about pharmacological cognitive enhancement (PCE)
and, for each issue, suggest the contribution that neuroscien-
tific research could make. The greatest contribution will be made
to the discussions surrounding the safety and efficacy of PCEs.
Although the question of what harms are worth risking in the pur-
suit of certain benefits is to a large extent normative, the dearth
of evidence about the effectiveness and safety of PCEs in real-
world contexts renders the discussion mostly hypothetical at this
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point. More research on the risks of dependency is also urgently
needed. Data of this kind will be crucial for discussions about reg-
ulation, and for debates about the permissibility of requiring or
encouraging people to use PCEs.
In addition to the contribution neuroscience will make to
understanding the risk-benefit profiles of PCEs, we suggest that
a more nuanced understanding of the neural systems affected by
different substances will enrich the debate about whether PCE
use constitutes cheating. Also related to cheating, we further sug-
gest that the neuroscientific evidence on the functional trade-offs
precipitated by some PCE adds an important dimension to the
debate about whether achievements facilitated by PCEs should be
seen to be effortless and involve little sacrifice. Drawing together
our conclusions, we propose an “ethical agenda” for future neu-
roscientific research on PCE. This agenda sets out what sort of
research would help move the ethical debates forward, and why.
Resolving these debates will be crucial for ensuring that society
responds to the increasing use of PCE in the most responsible,
fair and rational way. For a summary of our “ethical agenda” for
neuroscientific research, see Table 1.
OVERVIEW OF PHARMACOLOGICAL COGNITIVE
ENHANCEMENT
What it means to “enhance” is notoriously difficult to pin down.
To enhance is essentially to improve or increase, but what this
improvement must be relative to is not obvious. On the broad-
est definitions of enhancement, some capacity is enhanced if it
is improved relative to its prior level of functioning such that
it increases the individual’s chances of leading a good life—
enhancement thus occurs regardless of how well- or poorly-
functioning the capacity originally was (Savulescu et al., 2011).
On more restrictive definitions of enhancement, a capacity is
enhanced if it is improved beyond a particular point—perhaps
a species mean or agreed “normal” level of functioning (c.f. Sabin
and Daniels, 1994). Others define enhancement as any improve-
ment which goes beyond correcting pathology. For example: “A
Table 1 | Summary of ethical agenda for neuroscientific research.
Suggested type of study Advancement in ethical debate
Longitudinal studies investigating the long-term safety profile of
PCEs
This is perhaps the most pressing task for neuroscientists. The long-term,
real-world safety profile of PCEs is of considerable import to potential users
and to all debates about PCE ethics and policy. In relation to the latter
concerns, longitudinal studies will advance ethical debates about: (1) whether
PCEs should be placed on the open market for enhancement purposes (and
with what restrictions), and (2) whether employees doing particular types of
jobs can legitimately be required to take PCEs
Identification of pathology associated with mental or psychiatric
disorders or limitations to enable classificatory separation of
conditions which are diseases from those which constitute normal
human variation
Will advance the ethical debate about whether the administration and effects
of particular PCEs constitute treatment or enhancement, and how resources
should be deployed accordingly
Identification of the effects of PCEs in targeted and specified
populations of ethical significance, such as those who are worst off.
In particular, further research into the baseline effect should be
conducted
Will advance the debate about distributive justice and access to PCEs. If PCEs
have differential effects on those who are already worst off, this will be highly
relevant to their permissibility and just distribution
More precise distinction between the different cognitive effects of
different PCEs
Will (1) be of central relevance to whether certain putative PCEs will be used
for enhancement and, if so, in which contexts and (2) advance the debate on
cheating in competitive contexts: some effects (e.g., creativity) might be
considered more unfair than others (e.g., wakefulness) and enhancing
motivation vs. enhancing effectiveness might be considered relevant to the
value of any resulting achievements
Investigation of the functional trade-offs associated with different
PCEs
Will (1) be of central relevance to whether certain putative PCEs will be used
for enhancement and, if so, in which contexts and will (2) advance the debate
about the nature of the sacrifice possibly required for achievements to have
value. It will also (3) advance the debate about the practicality and legitimacy
of requiring certain people to take PCEs
Pursuit of a “personalized enhancement” approach to bring us
closer to understanding what effect any particular PCE will have in
any particular person
Will be relevant to many (if not all) ethical debates and policy considerations
including: (1) whether particular people could legitimately be required to take
PCEs in certain contexts, (2) who should be given priority access to which
PCEs, (3) whether unequal effects have ramifications for cheating. Only when
we can predict the personal benefits and costs of enhancement can policy be
truly informed and ethical
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cognitively enhanced person [. . . ] is not necessarily somebody
with particularly high (let alone super-human) cognitive capac-
ities. A cognitively enhanced person, rather, is somebody who has
benefited from an intervention that improves the performance of
some cognitive subsystem without correcting some specific, iden-
tifiable pathology or dysfunction of that subsystem” (Bostrom
and Sandberg, 2009). In this paper, we adopt the broader under-
standing of cognitive enhancement. We do this in part because
the substances currently available and likely to be available in the
near future effect only modest improvements (Husain andMehta,
2011), but also because we believe that any line intended to mark
the point at which an improvement counts as enhancement nec-
essarily involves a value judgement involving normative (ethical)
considerations.
Most of the substances cited as putative PCEs were originally
developed for clinical use, to treat conditions that are at least
partly characterized by some observable cognitive defect. Here,
again, it is sometimes difficult to decide what should count as
a cognitive defect. However, in the case of defective or deficient
capacities, decisions must be made about where to place the line
to determine who should receive medical attention and resources.
For example, two of the substances receiving the most atten-
tion from those interested in enhancement—methylphenidate
and modafinil—were originally developed to treat the symptoms
of ADHD and narcolepsy, respectively. More recently, however,
these substances have been used off-label by healthy individuals to
improve their memories, level of alertness, or powers of concen-
tration (e.g., Maher, 2008). Other substances with some modest
enhancing effects on cognition include donepezil, dopamine ago-
nists (such as d-amphetamine, bromocriptine, and pergolide),
guanfacine, atomoxetine, reboxetine, galantamine, rivastigmine,
and memantine. Working pharmacologically in different ways,
these substances have been shown to improve cognitive functions
such as response inhibition, working memory, episodic memory,
attention, vigilance, and incidental learning (see de Jongh et al.,
2008; Lanni et al., 2008; Husain and Mehta, 2011). However, this
limited evidence of effectiveness should be cautiously considered
alongside studies producing null results and some evidence of
task-specific impairments (see Hall and Lucke, 2010 and Advokat,
2010 for less optimistic reviews of the scientific literature on
PCE).
The prospect of being able to enhance any of these cogni-
tive functions probably would be attractive to many individuals.
Whether the goal of such enhancement would be to perform bet-
ter at work, to learn a skill or language quicker, to decrease the
need for rest in leisure time, or even just to experience one’s mind
as “sharper,” improving cognition would presumably come with
many benefits. Data from various prevalence studies indicate that
there are groups of individuals who use some of the substances
listed above for purposes of studying, to combat jet-lag or even to
facilitate completion of household chores (for a review of student
uses, see Smith and Farah, 2011; see also Maher, 2008).
Whilst the neuroscientific literature is reporting some mod-
est enhancement effects of these substances on the cognition
of healthy individuals (c.f. Husain and Mehta, 2011), the eth-
ical literature has been raising and responding to a variety of
issues pertaining to their use (for overview see Greely et al., 2008;
Bostrom and Sandberg, 2009). Some of these issues are practi-
cal, some socio-political and others relate to the individual user.
The overarching goal is to ascertain how permissible and how
moral PCE use is and how society and regulatory bodies should
respond to it. Although the ethical debate is principally a nor-
mative enterprise, it cannot reach firm conclusions about how to
proceed based purely on hypothetical reasoning and untutored
speculation: it must be informed by neuroscientific research pro-
viding the empirical facts about PCEs. In what follows, we outline
the key issues in the enhancement debate, emphasizing where we
think neuroscientific research might have particular importance
for the normative debate.
ETHICAL DEBATE AND THE RELEVANCE OF
NEUROSCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
MEDICAL SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS
In many ethical discussions of cognitive enhancers the first issue
to be raised (often to be set aside so that there can be any fur-
ther discussion at all) is whether cognitive enhancers aremedically
safe to use. Since there are no longitudinal studies yet examin-
ing the long-term use of pharmaceuticals such as modafinil and
methylphenidate, some authors argue that we currently do not
know enough about the potential dangers and that the avail-
ability and use of PCEs should be avoided on this basis (e.g.,
Drabiak-Syed, 2011; Boot et al., 2012).
Despite the huge interest in PCE from philosophers and sci-
entists, the evidence of their effectiveness is still inconclusive.
Moreover, where there is evidence of enhancement effects, they
often tend to be limited to improvements on specific tasks, are
only seen at certain dosages and are not observed in all peo-
ple (Ragan et al., 2013; Farah et al., 2014). Crucially, it must be
remembered that the degree and nature of any cognitive improve-
ments will be different for each PCE and so no sweeping claims
should be made about the effectiveness of PCEs in general. In
terms of both effectiveness and safety, it should also be noted
that short term studies carried out in laboratory settings are not
representative of long term use in real world contexts.
In his meta-analysis of randomized controlled trials of methy-
phendidate, Repantis et al. (2010) found a significant improve-
ment in the long-term memory of healthy participants, partic-
ularly when there was a longer interval between the learning
phase and recall. However, the meta-analysis revealed no signif-
icant improvements in attention, mood or executive functions.
Similar findings emerged from Farah et al.’s (2014) review of
more than fifty experiments on the effects of amphetamine and
methylphenidate: they found convincing evidence of an enhanc-
ing effect of stimulants on learning under some circumstances,
specifically when the retention interval between study and test
was longer than an hour, but not at shorter intervals. They also
concluded that the evidence for improvement of executive func-
tions was much less clear. There is some evidence to suggest that
the effects of methylphenidate on cognitive control are only sig-
nificantly positive in participants whose performance on placebo
was lowest (Smith and Farah, 2011).
In relation to the effectiveness of modafinil, Farah et al.’s
(2014) recent review of single dose studies of modafinil con-
cluded that there is clear evidence of enhanced executive function
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and memory for sleep-deprived individuals but, for rested adults,
whilst there were some positive findings for specific tasks such as
those requiring inhibitory control, there were also a large num-
ber of null results and the occasional finding of impairment. They
refer to this pattern—of limited improvements on some specific
tasks and impairment on others—as being “familiar” for PCEs.
There are also some reviews of the effectiveness of anti-
dementia medications for cognitive enhancement. These include
acetylcholinesterase inhibitors such as donepezil, rivastigmine,
and galantamine. A review conducted by Repantis (2013) con-
cluded that the few existing studies of effects in healthy partic-
ipants provide no consistent evidence for a neuroenhancement
effect. In the case of, donepezil there was some evidence to sug-
gest improvements on retention of training on complex aviation
tasks (Yesavage et al., 2002), improvements in verbal memory
and episodic memory (Gron et al., 2005). However, other stud-
ies showed no or limited effects on memory and attention and
two others showed transient impairment of episodic memory
(Beglinger et al., 2004, 2005). The same pattern of results suggest-
ing enhancement in some cases but no effect or even impairment
in others can be seen for donepezil. Further, a review of the effi-
cacy of these putative cognitive enhancers for patients with mild
cognitive impairment concluded that they did not improve cog-
nition or function among patients with low-level impairment
(Tricco et al., 2013).
Themedical safety of PCEs varies from substance to substance,
and side effects relate not only to the direct pharmacologi-
cal effects but also to broader psychological and physiological
changes. The review conducted by Repantis (2013) concluded
that in the majority of trials, the drugs were well tolerated.
However, side effects were noted. In relation to methylphenidate,
side effects included increased heart rate and some instances
of increases in blood pressure. Headaches, anxiety, nervousness,
dizziness, drowsiness, and insomnia were also typical complaints.
Repantis (2013) summarizes similar side effects for modafinil,
where adverse reactions included headache, dizziness, gastroin-
testinal complaints (e.g., nausea, abdominal pain, dry mouth),
increased diuresis, palpitations, nervousness, restlessness, and
sleep disturbances and insomnia (especially in studies with non-
sleep deprived individuals). In their recent review, Ragan et al.
(2013) highlight the fact that modafinil was reviewed by the
EuropeanMedicines Agency (2010), who concluded that it should
not be prescribed for obstructive sleep apnea, shift-work sleep
disorder, and idiopathic hypersomnia because of the risks of seri-
ous skin reaction, suicidality, depression, psychosis, and adverse
cardiovascular events.
In relation to anti-dementia drugs, Repantis (2013) concluded
that, in the majority of the trials in healthy adults, donepezil
was well tolerated. However, some side effects were reported
in some participants, including gastrointestinal complaints (e.g.,
nausea), headaches, dizziness, nightmares, and insomnia. The
meta analysis of anti-dementia drugs for people with mild cog-
nitive impairment (Tricco et al., 2013) revealed that patients
taking these medications experienced significantly more nausea,
diarrhea, vomiting, and headaches than patients taking placebo.
The authors also suggest that patients taking these medications
might be at greater cardiac risk, with one study finding a higher
incidence of bradycardia among patients who received galan-
tamine.
As Farah et al. (2014) emphasize, there is another type of risk
that should not be ignored in a consideration of the safety of
PCEs. Many pharmaceuticals, especially stimulants, present a risk
of dependence. The authors cite a nationwide survey analyzed by
Kroutil et al. (2006) which estimates that almost one in twenty
nonmedical users of prescription stimulants meet the criteria for
dependence or abuse (For further discussion of the potential for
addiction in student populations see Outram, 2010 and White
et al., 2006).
Finally, as Ragan et al. (2013) point out, there is no such
thing as a completely safe drug, only a drug whose benefits out-
weigh its drawbacks. However, it is also worth emphasizing that,
even if there are long-term risks associated with these substances,
this does not (by itself) mean that they should automatically be
prohibited. There are serious risks associated with many activi-
ties that the state permits because it is believed that individuals
should decide for themselves whether these risks are worth taking.
Dangerous sports and cosmetic surgery both come with risks, but
the value some individuals attach to the respective sporting expe-
riences and cosmetic effects justifies giving these individuals the
choice to take risks in their pursuit.
This caveat notwithstanding, and taking into account poten-
tial costs to the healthcare system, greater knowledge about safety
and efficacy will allow regulators to decide whether the deci-
sion about which risks are worth taking should be put in the
hands of consumers (for a detailed discussion of the way risks and
benefits should be assessed for cognitive enhancement devices,
such as brain stimulators, see Maslen et al., 2014). The ethical
debate about the level of risk consumers should be allowed to
take is of great practical importance when it comes to making
policy recommendations. In addition, the question of whether
the harms of a certain PCE outweigh its benefits will be impor-
tant to discussions about the permissibility of requiring indi-
viduals to use PCEs and about the possible need to protect
individuals from pressure to take any of the substances under
discussion.
Finally, the empirical project of identifying the different
effects PCEs have across a different individuals (c.f. Husain
and Mehta, 2011) is likely to feed into the normative debate
about which effects (for which individuals) constitute a form of
treatment and which effects (for which individuals) constitute
enhancement. We discuss these and other ethical issues in what
follows.
AUTHENTICITY AND NATURALNESS
There are a bundle of related ethical issues that are sometimes
raised under the broad heading of authenticity (see Bublitz and
Merkel, 2009; Juth, 2011). Some of these pertain to numerical
personal identity—do individuals become categorically differ-
ent persons when they transform themselves via enhancement?
(DeGrazia, 2005)—some consider less drastically what it is for
an individual to be to be more or less his or her “real” self (The
President’s Council on Bioethics, 2003), and other ethical con-
cerns pertain to what it is to be, and function as, a human being
(Kass, 2003).
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The principal tenet underlying authenticity objections against
the use of PCEs is that individuals are most themselves when they
are in their “natural,” unaltered state. If capacities and characteris-
tics fundamental to one’s identity are changed, then the individual
is recast as an altered or inauthentic person (e.g., Elliott, 1999).
This argument is premised on the idea that there is a “real,” true
self, and that this real self is to be preserved as much as pos-
sible. However, this assumption can be challenged: individuals
often (and understandably) try to improve themselves in ways
that allow them to more successfully achieve their goals. Being
autonomous is to form goals for how one’s life is to go, includ-
ing what kind of person to be. On this model of authenticity
as autonomy, whether PCE is authentic depends on whether it
helps a person to achieve her autonomous goals. For example, an
individual might teach him or herself motivational strategies to
overcome his or her naturally lazy disposition; another individual
might use techniques from cognitive behavior therapy to over-
come his or her propensity for generalized anxiety (e.g., Butler
et al., 2006) or shyness, or gregariousness, or bad temper, or gulli-
bility. Such strategies may not render the individuals inauthentic,
but rather assist them in removing barriers that otherwise pre-
vent them from maximizing self-actualization. Correspondingly,
if PCEs can, for example, help an individual to concentrate bet-
ter so that he or she can achieve the goals he or she values, this
acts in service of authenticity rather than undermines it. There
is great human variation, and variation within individuals subject
to many intrinsic and extrinsic factors (see Kahane and Savulescu,
2013). Even if the authentic self were defined, it seems likely that
many factors interfere and PCEs may reduce the effect of such
influences.
However, some deny that authenticity is reducible to auton-
omy. Such writers (e.g., Taylor, 1991) appeal to a “real self.” But
even on such an account, the real self may be complex and mul-
tifaceted. Often people have a range of qualities and they may
use PCEs to bring out some of their qualities, while suppress-
ing others. Thus, whether an enhanced self compromises the real
self depends on what constitutes a person’s real self and what the
effect of the PCE is—both questions for cognitive science. If PCEs
merely amplify, rather than add entirely new qualities, then they
enable the self to evolve, rather than replacing one individual with
a set of attributes with another with different attributes.
There is a related but different concern about naturalness.
The idea that enhancements will take us too far from what it
is to be human altogether is often accompanied by the idea
that too much technological intervention will lead to an over-
mechanization of the mind. The activities in which we engage—
and, more importantly, the ways in which we engage in them—
are said to have a certain quality to them that makes them
“human” activities (President’s Council on Bioethics, 2003). In
this vein, Kass (2003) argues that since individuals play no role
in bringing about the effects of biomedical interventions, they
cannot understand these effects “in human terms.” His sug-
gestion is that whereas the effects of studying or training are
“intelligible” to us, the effects of direct interventions are not
comprehensible and thus our use of them departs “from “gen-
uine,” unmediated, and (in principle) self-transparent human
activity” (p. 23).
However, we argue that we make use of many directly-acting
substances, in medicine and in leisure, that do not result in depar-
ture from “genuine” human activity. Just because their pharma-
cological mechanisms are not understood by the average person
does not mean that they cannot be made sense of as part of a
human narrative. Kass cites alcohol, caffeine and nicotine as not
having the same unintelligible quality as direct biomedical inter-
ventions. He says this is because “we use these agents not as pure
chemicals but in forms and social contexts that, arguably, give
them a meaning different from what they would have were we to
take them as pills” (p. 22). An obvious objection to Kass’ resis-
tance to PCEs would be to add PCEs to beverages, as caffeine
currently is. It would then be “intelligible” in the same way that
caffeine is said to be “intelligible.” Moreover, if intelligibility can
be conferred by social context then the social context of, for exam-
ple, studying, or conducting research should equally make PCEs
part of a comprehensible human enterprise. Perhaps his distinc-
tion between the forms alcohol, caffeine, and nicotine tend to
take, and the form of a simple pill, is supposed to indicate that
the former are enjoyed for themselves, rather than being instru-
mental to achieve some goal. However, studies have reported
that some individuals take PCEs for recreational purposes (see
Smith and Farah, 2011) and it is common knowledge that caffeine
is regularly used exclusively for alertness and for performance
enhancement. Even if it might be the case in lay people’s current
perceptions (cf. Faulmüller et al., 2013; Schelle et al., 2014), from
a normative stance it cannot be that form and context make all the
difference between the human intelligibility of an espresso and a
caffeine pill and a PCE.
The core of such an “intelligibility” objection may be that
PCEs and other new technologies work in ways entirely alien to
the way the human mind normally works, adding a completely
new way of being. For example, chips inserted into the human
brain that allowed us to perceive other people’s thoughts directly
would be entirely new. Neuroscience can assist by unravelling the
way the mind does work, and does not, and by enabling catego-
rization of enhancers into those which harness natural processes,
and those that introduce entirely new capacities. Most enhancers
at present appear to harness existing neurobiological physiology,
though exactly how many enhance performance remains to be
determined.
The ethical debate about authenticity and naturalness is
unlikely to be advanced solely by the findings of neuroscientific
research. The disagreement is partly a normative one about what
constitutes the “real” self and whether our “real” selves are the
selves we are most prone to being or the selves that we aspire to
develop in to—or whether it makes sense to speak of “real” selves
at all. Qualitative research, such as that conducted by Singh (2005)
or Bolt and Schermer (2009), will helpfully provide a clearer pic-
ture of the sorts of experiences individuals have when taking
PCEs.
In summary, it is important to recognize that most PCEs, if
not all, harness innate biological systems, for example, affecting
release, reuptake or sensitivity to neurotransmitters that cause
cognitive activity. They do not at present introduce radical “new
ways of being” divorced from the ordinary human way—they
really just provide “more of the same.” Indeed, humans vary in
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the ways in which their cognitive systems function and in some
cases, PCEs may bring those at the lower end of normal up to the
level of function of those in the mid to upper range.
More importantly, we suggest that what matters more than
whether the experiences are in some sense authentic is whether
the individual wants and values the effects of the PCE andwhether
the individual is autonomous in his or her decision to use PCE.
This, we suggest, is a legitimate concern and is addressed in the
following section.
COERCION
If PCEs were to become more commonplace, then employers
might start to require their employees to use PCEs. The Academy
of Medical Sciences et al. (2012) suggested in a recent report that
“[O]ccupations that require particular patterns of focus could
benefit from enhancements that facilitate achieving such patterns.
For example, surgeons may need to be able to concentrate for
extended periods, whereas other jobs such as air traffic control
can require very rapid reactions during periods of relative uni-
formity. As an extrapolation to this, it is possible that in these
high-responsibility occupations enhancement could be seen as a
moral obligation, or even demanded by the public.” (p. 38, for
a discussion see also Maslen et al., in press). The US Airforce
has already approved the use of modafinil by its pilots (Caldwell
and Caldwell, 2005) and some medical practitioners are begin-
ning to wonder whether enhancement might be required of them
in the future (Rose and Curry, 2010). Writing in the Journal of
Surgical Research, surgeons have suggested that the use of PCEs
may come to be required practice. They say, “The prospect of
fatigued surgeons taking a prescription drug, such as modafinil,
to allow them to operate for longer, and possibly to a higher stan-
dard, is perhaps not as far-fetched as somemay suggest. This drug
has already been trialed in emergency physicians, when perform-
ing non-medical-related tasks at the end of a nightshift.” (Warren
et al., 2009, p. 168).
Further, the authors note that there are “useful and warranted
forms of coercion” (p. 170) such as forcing surgeons to under-
take hygiene practices such as handwashing prior to and during
surgery. Given that this coercion is acceptable, they go on to ask,
“What will our employers feel about a drug that makes us less
prone to error, able to work longer hours, or to operate more
efficiently? Employers are able to request certain behavioral stan-
dards from their employees, dictate rest periods, and insist on
abstinence from certain drugs to ensure that their doctors per-
form well—will a day arise where they can recommend or even
insist on surgeons being artificially enhanced? This may seem fan-
ciful, but recent work has suggested that a mixture of napping and
caffeine attenuates fatigue in interns and thus should be adopted
by hospital administration. Why not other types of stimulant?”
(p. 171).
The ethical objection often raised in this context is that,
although it is thought to be reasonable to require certain things
of employees, such as compulsory training and codes of conduct,
requiring them to ingest psychoactive substances into their bod-
ies is too demanding a requirement. It would require a compelling
justification (perhaps pointing to the severity of harm that would
be prevented through requiring enhancement) to trump the value
we place on preserving the right individuals have to determine
what happens to their bodies and minds (for discussion of the
right to mental self-determination in relation to enhancement
and other mental manipulation, see Bublitz and Merkel, 2014).
As far as possible, this right should be preserved, and this is
especially the case where there is not enough evidence about
the harms to which an employer would be subjecting his or her
employee. Neuroscientific evidence will have a large role to play
in understanding the seriousness of any proposed requirement.
In addition to the risks posed by individual instances of PCE use,
more data on the potential for dependency will be essential for
this discussion. Whilst we might think it permissible to require
some employees to take small, isolated personal risks, requiring
them to do something that results in substance dependency would
more comprehensively infringe an individual’s autonomy. In this
connection, although PCEs may become more common in the
workplace, one of us has argued elsewhere that for these and
other reasons, it is unlikely that there will ever be a legal obli-
gation for a professional like a surgeon to take a PCE (Goold and
Maslen, 2014). At present, no employer requires employees to take
caffeine. Caffeine is a PCE.
Even if people were not directly coerced to take enhancers it
could still be objected that permitting PCE use could result in
indirect pressure to use them. The perception that others are tak-
ing substances that make them more productive could lead to
the belief that taking them is necessary to keep up (Academy of
Medical Sciences et al., 2012) and not taking PCEs might ren-
der one de facto ineligible for certain jobs (Chatterjee, 2004).
However, whether indirect pressure to take PCEs would in fact
result in their more prevalent use is a question for social science.
(For empirical data relating to this question, see Franke et al., 2011
and Maier et al., 2013). Neuroscientific research will have little
to contribute to the debate about the limits of acceptable social
pressure and restriction on employees’ autonomy. However, as
noted above, opposition to enforced PCE use is partly motivated
by the current lack of evidence on long-term safety and efficacy.
What we can legitimately require of people is closely related to
what risks we can require them to take. Assessment of the legiti-
macy of requiring certain individuals to take PCEs will depend in
large part on their medical safety and efficacy. If PCEs are very
safe and efficacious, their use in life-saving/threatening profes-
sions (e.g., surgeons, politicians, truck drivers, airline pilots, etc.)
may legitimately be required.
TREATMENT vs. ENHANCEMENT
As noted in the introductory section, there is much disagreement
about what should count as enhancement (c.f., Parens, 1998).
Sometimes this disagreement is framed as a debate about where
treatment ends and enhancement begins. The distinction often
made is that treatments serve to cure illness and preserve health
whereas enhancements make people “better than well.” For exam-
ple, Juengst (1998) defines enhancement as the term “usually used
in bioethics to characterize interventions designed to improve
human form or functioning beyond what is necessary to sustain
or restore good health” (p. 29).
However, a common objection to this distinction is that, in
many cases, what we define as “healthy” and “normal” is arbitrary.
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This objection does not deny that there can be clear failures of
function or physiology as a result of pathology which most would
agree are inimical to good health, such as the effects of a brain
hemorrhage or stroke. Rather, it emphasizes that the boundary
between healthy and unhealthy cognition in many cases is a mat-
ter of where we choose to draw the line, not based on either
statistically significant subfunctioning or pathology. For example,
delimiting normal from defective powers of concentration when
diagnosing ADHD is necessarily to engage in marking a categor-
ical point on what is otherwise a continuum (c.f. Schermer and
Bolt, 2011). The point could be selected further to the left or right
on that continuum of functioning. Would selecting a point which
increased ADHD diagnosis increase the instances of individuals
being treated or would some be receiving enhancement through
the back door? Since the point is to some extent arbitrary, the
corresponding labels of treatment and enhancement appear less
meaningful in this context.
Similarly, it is difficult to know whether to classify substances
used to combat age-related cognitive decline as instances of treat-
ment or enhancement. Drawing sharp lines could have the result
that a young person with cognitive abilities just above the cut
off for being classified as having a mental disability would be
“enhanced” by a drug but the elderly person whose abilities
slipped to a level still above the young person would be receiving
“treatment” if given the same substance (for a similar example,
see Sandberg, 2011). Given the slipperiness of the distinction, one
of us has argued (Savulescu et al., 2011) that instead of trying to
determine whether certain drugs or certain of their effects con-
stitute treatment or enhancement, it is more coherent and useful
to think of a continuum of well-being which can be increased or
diminished by various interventions.
It might be thought that evidence from neuroscience could
adjudicate between instances of treatment and enhancement. If
substances have discernable, discrete effects on different groups
of people, it could be argued that these discrete effects mark the
difference between a treatment and an enhancement. For exam-
ple, although the way modafinil works is still unknown in detail
(Minzenberg and Carter, 2008), neurologists do know that the
brain of the narcoleptic is not neurophysiologically equivalent to
the brain of the sleep-deprived individual and, correspondingly,
it might be hypothesized that the effects of modafinil on the two
groups will differ. Most forms of narcolepsy are associated with a
deficiency in the hypothalamic neurotransmitter orexin (Mignot,
2010). The average sleep-deprived person, in contrast, does not
exhibit such a deficiency. Accordingly, it might be thought that the
more differences neuroscience can reveal between the narcoleptic
and the non-narcoleptic, the better equipped we will be to distin-
guish between the treatment and enhancement effects of at least
this PCE.
However, such knowledge would still not provide a defini-
tive solution to which effects we should refer to as treatment
and which we should call enhancement. Modafinil is also pre-
scribed for shift work sleep disorder (SWSD), which is a product
of unusual working patterns affecting circadian rhythms, not of
underlying neurophysiology (Åkerstedt and Wright, 2009). This
being said, it should be noted that not everyone who does shift
work suffers from SWSD. This suggests that there must be some
physiological or psychological difference between sufferers and
non-sufferers and our lack of knowledge as to the cause of this
difference does not make the disorder less of a treatable disorder.
In labeling the prescription of PCEs for SWSD an instance
of treatment, a normative or ethical decision is still being made
about which conditions and patterns of functionality should
attract medical attention and resources. We are also implicitly
making an assessment that medical treatment is the just and
appropriate course of action for sufferers of the disorder, rather
than prioritizing a change away from shift work. Neither the
individual’s underlying neurophysiology nor the particular mech-
anism of action of the substance tells us anything about whether
this decision is the correct one.
One avenue through which neuroscience might illuminate the
treatment vs. enhancement debate is by identifying pathology
associated with mental or psychiatric disorders or limitations. So
far, accurate tissue or cellular level pathological classification of
psychiatric disease or disorder has eluded researchers. However,
if psychiatric disorders could be characterized in the same way as
neurological disorders, the presence of pathology would separate
conditions which are diseases from those which constitute normal
human variation.
Given that PCEs are not universally available through the
healthcare system, individuals without conditions for which PCEs
are approved would currently have to obtain them through other,
unauthorized routes. This means that some people will have
access to them but others will not. Even if PCEs were available
on an open market, there could still be financial or other bar-
riers to their accessibility. We discuss this issue and its potential
implications next.
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
Society-level debates about PCE-related inequality consider dis-
tributive justice, and are related the question of whether PCEs will
exacerbate existing socio-economic inequality. A common argu-
ment is that, as with many technologies, the rich and informed
will have access to them whilst the poor and uninformed will
not (e.g., Fukuyama, 2002). Assuming that cognitive enhance-
ment confers some benefits, this will make those already at an
advantage even better off. Whether this would in fact happen
would depend on factors such as the affordability and accessibil-
ity of PCEs, as well as on the realities of their cognition-improving
effects: the affordability and accessibility of PCEs will determine
whether people are able to use them; the effects of the substances
will determine whether they really put people who do so at an
advantage. However, although there is the potential for PCEs
to exacerbate unfairness if their distribution is unregulated, as
one of us points out elsewhere, this is not a necessary conse-
quence (Sandberg and Savulescu, 2011): if PCEs were distributed
according to a principle of justice such as “prioritarianism”—
the principle that says that we should give priority to those who
are worst off, but also aim to maximize well-being of every-
one in society—then PCEs would be most accessible to the
worst off, becoming less accessible (but not inaccessible) as need
decreases.
Further as we go on to discuss below in relation to compet-
itive fairness, neuroscientific evidence supports the hypothesis
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that there is a base-line effect of many PCEs: their effects seem
to depend on the subject’s baseline working memory capacity.
Individuals with low working-memory capacity improve while
high-span individuals are either not affected or are even impaired
(de Jongh et al., 2008). This means that those most in need
of PCE would benefit most from it, with those less in need
not benefiting at all or even experiencing impairment from the
same substance. Given this evidence, it has been suggested that
enhancement might actually serve to reduce inequality (Bostrom
and Sandberg, 2009). However, whilst this could be true in terms
of the equality of cognitive capacity, it must be remembered
that cognitive capacity and socio-economic status are not always
correlated: there would still be people with more opportuni-
ties and resources who could improve their prospects further.
Whilst policy decisions about access to PCEs will be principally
socio-political matters, those making the decisions will need to
know how enhancers affect members of the population in order
to best serve the interests of justice and equality. If PCEs have
differential effects on those who are already worst off, this will
be highly relevant to their permissibility and just distribution.
Neuroscience research can thus contribute to ethical debate if
effects in targeted and specified populations of ethical significance
are studied. This would require ethically relevant population
stratification.
COMPETITIVE FAIRNESS AND CHEATING
The ethical discussion of whether using cognitive enhancers con-
stitutes cheating—perhaps in exams or at work—ismore nuanced
than the simple question of whether taking enhancers is “against
the rules.” It can extend beyond considerations of fairness in
competitive contexts to ask whether personal achievements facil-
itated by PCEs are devalued for this reason (c.f., Schermer,
2008; Goodman, 2010; Santoni de Sio et al., in press). We sug-
gest that evidence from neuroscience will help to develop the
cheating debate in important ways. Below, we argue that three
types of empirical inquiry are relevant to the ethical discussion.
The first, the phenomenon of the “inverted U”—according to
which the enhancing effects of PCEs are often baseline depen-
dent and exhibit non-linear dose response curves —(de Jongh
et al., 2008; Husain and Mehta, 2011), is relevant to efficacy
questions involved in debates about cheating. The second type
of study relevant to the debate is that which seeks to identify
the particular neural systems affected by different substances,
leading to disparate effects (e.g., Lanni et al., 2008): whether a
substance improves creativity or rote learning may matter for
some possible conceptions of what constitutes cheating. Similarly,
whether a substance improves motivation and task enjoyment
vs. memory capacity might matter for those who place a lot
of value on success requiring effort. Third, we argue that the
neuroscientific evidence pointing to the likelihood of cogni-
tive trade-offs (de Jongh et al., 2008; Husain and Mehta, 2011)
adds an underdeveloped dimension to the cheating debate: if
the complaint is that achievements facilitated by PCE are deval-
ued because they do not involve enough personal sacrifice, then
evidence suggesting that enhancement in some domains comes
at the cost of impairments in others offers a challenge to this
view.
The inverted U curve and baseline dependency
Neuroscientific research so far shows that the effects of many
purported PCEs are base-line dependent and have an inverted
U-shaped dose-response curve (de Jongh et al., 2008; Husain
and Mehta, 2011). This is important to the cheating debate as
it means that some individuals will benefit from taking PCEs
whereas others will gain no benefit and might even be impaired:
low performing individuals will tend to be on the upward slope
of the inverted-U and so benefit from a substance that moves
them further up this slope. High performing individuals, on the
other hand, will tend to be at the peak of the inverted U and will
therefore become impaired by a substance that increases neuro-
transmitter levels further. If neuroscience were to more precisely
identify the neurological profiles of those who are able to benefit
from PCEs and those who are not then ethicists would be able to
consider in greater detail whether the prospect of some being able
to enhance whilst others cannot counts more decisively against
PCE in competitive contexts than if all could enhance in these
contexts. They would need to consider whether it is the case that
enhancement is only fair if everyone could (in principle) avail
themselves of it or whether is it permissible given that some are
physiologically denied the possibility of improving.
Disparate effects of different PCEs
Although the exact mechanisms of substances like
methylphenidate and modafinil are not yet fully understood,
researchers have begun to investigate which PCEs affect which
underlying systems, and with which effects (Lanni et al., 2008;
Smith and Farah, 2011). Although cognitive functions necessarily
interact, attempts have been made to ascertain the primary
cognitive functions improved by particular PCEs based on their
effects on neurotransmitters. Husain and Mehta (2011) explain
that “a simple mapping between a specific neurotransmitter and a
particular cognitive function—such as [working memory]—[. . . ]
seems untenable. However, subtle but important differences in
the precise processes modulated might provide some discrimi-
nating value: for instance, dopamine has an established role in
reinforcement learning in response to rewards, whereas serotonin
seems to modulate reinforcement learning for aversive stimuli.”
(p. 29). Pursuing such discrimination, Lanni et al. (2008) review
the neuroscience literature investigating the neuronal circuits,
neurotransmitters and molecular events underlying the cognitive
domains of memory, attention, and creativity to distinguish the
effects of different enhancement substances. Elsewhere, Smith
and Farah (2011) review the cognitive neuroscience literature to
examine whether (and which) prescription stimulants improve
learning, working memory, cognitive control, and other executive
functions.
If neuroscientific research were able to distinguish between
the effects of different PCEs this could have some implications
for discussions about cheating. This is again effect stratification.
Combined with population stratification, neuroscience research
could bring us closer to understanding what effect this particular
PCE will have in this person. This reflects the move to “person-
alized medicine” and might be dubbed “personalized enhance-
ment.” Only when we can predict the personal benefits and costs
of enhancement can policy be truly informed and ethical.
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It might be thought that the enhancement of some cognitive
functions is more unfair than the enhancement of others. For
example, the enhancement of creative thinking might be thought
to constitute more significant cheating than improving wakeful-
ness or even memory capacity. Imagine someone who says “when
I take enhancers my work is no better, I can just do more of the
same for longer” vs. someone who says “when I taken enhancers
my work is much better than I can do without them.” Having links
with the debate about authenticity, it is as if the former individual
is enabled tomake better use of his or her own cognitive resources,
whereas the latter is given new cognitive resources upon which he
or she can draw. Those who think PCE use is unfair because the
achievement is not a reflection of the person’s natural abilities to
solve and create might be less concerned by a PCE that simply
allowed more efficient work of the standard the person could nat-
urally achieve. A PCE that promoted wakefulness might allow an
individual to work for longer but it will not come up with ideas
on his or her behalf. Of course, it is important to remember that
a PCE that improved creativity still has its effects on and through
the individual’s own brain.What will be interesting for ethicists to
discuss is whether “assistance” with time management and effi-
ciency is relevantly different to “assistance” with the content of
ideas (if, indeed, we want to characterize the respective effects in
this way).
Practical consequences might be to consider certain substances
unfair for certain types of tests or for entry into certain types
of employment: employers might only be troubled by the use of
PCEs, the effects of which are necessary to carry out the job. This
would be a practical consideration: could the employee continue
to work without the PCE? For example, an architect who could
only perform satisfactorily when taking a substance like modafinil
that seems to improves spatial planning and visual pattern recog-
nition memory (Turner et al., 2003) might be thought to be a
higher risk employee than one who uses a memory enhancer
which enables him or her to remember the names of building
materials that he could look up without problem in the absence
of the substance.
Further, neuroscientific research that could distinguish
between substances that enhance the effectiveness of cognitive
capacities, such as working memory, from those that instead
(or additionally) increase motivation could also have implica-
tions for the competitive fairness debate. In the ethical literature,
the point is sometimes made that it is effort and striving that
makes achievements intelligible and valuable. For example, Fox
(2005) argues that “[b]ecause they act directly on the human
body andmind, biotechnological enhancements tempt us to shirk
individual striving and struggle” (p. 1150).
A common rebuttal to this type of argument is that, whilst
PCEs can make efforts more effective, they do not replace the
need for dedicated, sustained study—striving and struggle is still
required in order to achieve. For example, Greely (2010) notes
that “the more plausible cognitive enhancements would not elim-
inate the need to study; they would just make studying more
effective” (p. 6).
If, however, there were a significant enough effect of a PCE
on motivation and/or task enjoyment, then it would be open
to ethicists to argue that this does in some sense reduce the
amount of effort that the person puts in. The drive to work or
achieve no longer emanates from the individual and no struggle
is encountered.
On the motivating effects of prescription stimulants, Smith
and Farah (2011) write: “Another empirical question concerns the
effects of stimulants on motivation, which can affect academic
and occupational performance independent of cognitive ability.
Volkow et al. (2004) showed that [methylphenidate] increased
participants’ self-rated interest in a relatively dull mathemati-
cal task. This is consistent with student reports that prescrip-
tion stimulants make schoolwork seem more interesting (e.g.,
DeSantis et al., 2008). To what extent are the motivational effects
of prescription stimulants distinct from their cognitive effects,
and to what extent might they be more robust to differences in
individual traits, dosage and task? Are the motivational effects of
stimulants responsible for their usefulness when taken by normal
healthy individuals for cognitive enhancement?” (p. 735).
If particular PCEs were shown to significantly improve moti-
vation and/or task enjoyment whilst others only improve effec-
tiveness, ethicists would need to consider whether there is any
relevant difference between enhancing motivation and enhanc-
ing effectiveness and, if so, what the implications would be for the
value of resulting achievements.
Enhancement is likely to involve trade-offs
Research suggests that enhancing one domain of cognition might
come at the cost of impairing another. de Jongh et al. (2008)
review evidence suggesting trade-offs between long-term mem-
ory and working memory; between stability and flexibility of
long-term memory; between stability and flexibility of working
memory; and perhaps, they conjecture, between cognition and
mood. If a PCE comes at a cost—and, especially, a mental cost—
this could also add a new dimension to the debate about cheating
and the value of achievements.
In terms of gaining an unfair advantage over others in exams
and other competitive tasks, the trade-offs would be relevant if
the test required exercise of both the enhanced and the impaired
capacity. Whilst the individual gains some advantage in some
parts of the test, he or she would be disadvantaged in other parts.
More generally, neuroscientific evidence of trade-offs are inter-
esting to the debate about fairness and the value of achievements
because some of the objections rest heavily on the idea that using
PCEs means that no sacrifice—usually conceived as sacrifice of
time, energy or other opportunities—is made by the individual.
For example, Kass (2003) says: “Yet in those areas of human
life in which excellence has until now been achieved only by
discipline and effort, the attainment of those achievements by
means of drugs, genetic engineering, or implanted devices looks
to be “cheating” or “cheap.” We believe—or until only yesterday
believed—that people should work hard for their achievements.
“Nothing good comes easily.”” (p. 21).
If enhancement of one domain of cognition comes at the
cost of another then it does seem that some sort of sacri-
fice has been made. We might conceive of an individual who
chooses to enhance his or her working memory such that he
or she can solve complicated puzzles quickly. This same indi-
vidual might accept that this enhancement comes at the cost
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of him or her finding it harder to recall facts and experiences
from longer ago. Accordingly, whilst the physical act of ingest-
ing a substance might be easy, there is a sense in which the
enhanced capacity did not come easily—it did not come without
personal cost. Whilst the conceptually most interesting trade-
offs will involve impairments to cognitive capacities—like for
like—it should also be noted that the more general side effects
of PCEs (discussed in relation to medical safety above) also
constitute an additional sort of “cost” to enhancement. The evi-
dence on medical safety reviewed in section Medical Safety and
Effectiveness suggests that PCE use will always come at a cost and
may involve multiple costs of different kinds. The number and
nature of these unavoidable costs constitute further challenge to
the view that achievements facilitated by enhancement involve no
sacrifice.
Important to note is that these costs of a trade-off are not like
financial costs, which can be trivial and will constitute diminish-
ment only insofar as they prevent the individual from making
other purchases important to him or her. Rather, the costs of an
enhancement trade-off are often mental costs—like for like—and
are of a kind much more likely to constitute diminishment. Thus,
neuroscientific research poses questions for those engaged in
the cheating debate about whether there are relevant differences
between different various costs of achievement—effort, opportu-
nity, physiological side effects, cognitive trade-offs—andwhich (if
any) are required for achievements to involve a sufficient level of
sacrifice.
CONCLUSION
We have reviewed six of themain issues debated by ethicists work-
ing on PCE. Often, their purpose in debating these issues is to
clarify concepts and normative positions, which then serve as a
basis for recommending how society—and especially those tasked
with its regulation—should respond to the emergence of PCEs.
We have argued that whilst some of these issues are mostly polit-
ical (coercion) or metaphysical (what constitutes authenticity),
others have much to gain from emerging neuroscientific research.
As well as providing data on safety and effectiveness, neuroscience
will also allow a more fine-grained debate about whether the
effects of some PCEs are more unfair than others in compet-
itive contexts and whether employers should be more wary of
employee reliance on some PCEs than on others. Further, due to
emerging evidence on trade-offs, those who object to PCE on the
ground that it facilitates individual gain without any attendant
pain will have to explain why accepting an associated impair-
ment in exchange for an enhancement is not a relevant sacrifice.
Although we anticipate that ethicists will be far from stumped
by this challenge, we hope to have demonstrated that it will,
in large part, be though responding to emerging scientific evi-
dence that normative accounts become more refined, complete
and practically relevant.
In general, neuroscience can contribute to the formation of
ethical policy on PCEs by adopting a “personalized” approach:
personalized enhancement. Fine grained and stratified research
should seek to identify specific risks, benefits, and trade-offs in
small ethically relevant populations, or ideally in individuals. In
doing this, according to the ethical values principles and criteria
we choose, we can form policy on who should access which PCEs
in which ways.
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